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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 This diversity case requires us to interpret the scope 
of a purported spendthrift provision in a trust created in the 
early part of the century.  In so doing, we face an issue of 
first impression under the laws of Pennsylvania and most other 
states:  the applicability of section 157(c) of the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts, which allows creditors to reach a spendthrift 
trust interest in limited circumstances.  The district court 
found the trust contained a spendthrift provision protecting the 
interest of the beneficiary and that Pennsylvania courts would 
not apply the Restatement exception under the circumstances of 
  
this case.  Schreiber v. Kellogg, 849 F. Supp. 382, 389, 394 
(E.D. Pa. 1994).  We will affirm in part and reverse in part. 
 I.  
 In 1928, Rodman Wanamaker died, leaving a will and 
codicils1  that established trusts for his children and their 
descendants.  At issue in this case is a $120 million trust 
created in Paragraph Third of his will. 
 For half a century, the trust consisted of the stock in 
the John Wanamaker department store.  In March 1978, Carter, 
Hawley, Hale, Inc. offered the trust $40 million for the 
Wanamaker stock.  Christopher G. Kellogg, one of Wanamaker's 
great-grandchildren and a contingent income beneficiary of the 
trust,2 engaged attorney Palmer K. Schreiber to increase the 
                     
1
.  The Wanamaker will and its codicils have provided much 
material for judicial opinion, including at least three decisions 
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and a number by the Montgomery 
County Orphans' Court.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Wanamaker, 159 
A.2d 201 (Pa. 1960); In re Wanamaker's Estate, 6 A.2d 852 (Pa. 
1939); In re Wanamaker's Estate, 167 A. 592 (Pa. 1933); In re 
Wanamaker Estate, 105 Montgomery County L. Rep. 372 (Montgomery 
County Orphans' Ct. 1979); In re Wanamaker Estate, No. 38,456 
(Montgomery County Orphans' Ct. Feb. 27, 1975). 
2
.  Although the will did not expressly provide that Wanamaker's 
great-grandchildren would succeed to their parents' interests in 
the trust, Judge Alfred L. Taxis, Jr., of the Montgomery County 
Orphans' Court ruled two decades ago that the failure to include 
such specific language was an oversight of the drafter.  In re 
Wanamaker Estate, No. 38,456 (Montgomery County Orphans' Ct. Feb. 
27, 1975).  Thus, Kellogg became a contingent beneficiary as a 
result of this 1975 decision; he became an income beneficiary 
upon the death of his mother in August 1989.  Cf. Schreiber v. 
Kellogg, 849 F. Supp. 382, 384 nn.1-2 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (decision 
on execution of judgment).  He receives $31,500 per month in 
income from the trust.  Schreiber v. Kellogg, 839 F. Supp. 1157, 
1160 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (decision on motion to stay judgment). 
  
purchase price of the stock.  Partially as a result of those 
efforts, the stock was sold for $60 million, about $20 million 
more than the original offer.  For his services, the Montgomery 
County Orphans' Court awarded Schreiber $117,000 in counsel fees 
and interest from the corpus of the trust, and he later received 
a judgment of nearly $88,000, plus counsel fees and interest, 
against another attorney involved in the stock sale for breach of 
a fee-sharing agreement. 
 In October 1978, after the stock was sold, Schreiber 
filed a surcharge action on behalf of Kellogg against the 
trustees of the Wanamaker trust, alleging negligence, 
mismanagement, and breach of fiduciary duty.  In May 1981, the 
parties settled the suit.  The trustees agreed to hold regular 
meetings, make certain information available to beneficiaries, 
and file a plan for the creation of a retirement age for 
trustees.  For his part, Kellogg agreed to pay his own counsel 
fees and to obtain a release of any claims against the trust from 
his counsel.  Schreiber and Kellogg then signed a fee agreement 
that provided for Kellogg to pay Schreiber $80,000, plus interest 
at a "commercially competitive" rate.   
 When Kellogg failed to pay the amount due, Schreiber 
filed this suit for breach of contract.  The district court 
awarded him $512,864 for counsel fees and interest, and we 
affirmed.  Schreiber v. Kellogg, 37 F.3d 1488 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 During the pendency of the appeal, Schreiber asked the 
district court to execute on Kellogg's interest in the trust to 
satisfy the judgment.  The court denied the motion, holding that 
  
Wanamaker had intended to provide spendthrift protection for his 
great-grandchildren and Kellogg's interest in the trust was 
protected.  Schreiber v. Kellogg, 849 F. Supp. 382, 389 (E.D. Pa. 
1994).  The court also ruled that Pennsylvania courts would not 
apply, under the circumstances of this case, section 157(c) of 
the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959), which permits judgment 
creditors that preserve or benefit an interest in a spendthrift 
trust to reach that interest to enforce valid claims.  Id. at 
394.  Schreiber appealed. 
 The district court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 (1988).  Our review of the district court's construction 
of Pennsylvania law is de novo.  Salve Regina College v. Russell, 
499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991) ("We conclude that a court of appeals 
should review de novo a district court's determination of state 
law."); Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 
1557 (3d Cir.) ("The determinations regarding state law, where 
appropriate, will be reviewed de novo."), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 480 (1994).  Our standard of review of the district court's 
interpretation of the Wanamaker will depends on whether 
Pennsylvania law treats such an interpretation as a question of 
law or of fact.3 
                     
3
.  Because this is a diversity case, we look to state law to 
determine whether a trial court's interpretation of a will is a 
question of law subject to de novo review or one of fact under a 
clearly erroneous standard.  See United States v. Tabor Court 
Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1304 (3d Cir. 1986) (citation 
omitted) ("In Pennsylvania, the existence of actual intent [for a 
fraud action] is a question of fact; therefore, the court's 
determination is reviewed on the clearly erroneous standard."), 
  
 Under Pennsylvania law, interpretation of a will 
generally is a question of law, as long as the court determines 
the meaning of the document solely from its language and not from 
any surrounding circumstances.  Cf. In re Estate of Livingston, 
612 A.2d 976, 981 n.2 (Pa. 1992) ("In this case, the courts were 
called upon to interpret the legal effect of a writing.  This 
entails reaching a conclusion of law."); Miller v. Bower, 103 A. 
727, 728 (Pa. 1918) ("[T]he question dividing the parties was 
resolved into a pure question of law arising out of the 
construction of the will . . . .").  Because the district court 
here apparently did not consider any evidence beyond the four 
corners of the will,4 our review is a question of Pennsylvania 
law subject to de novo review. 
(..continued) 
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); De Oliveira v. United States, 
767 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Because 
the testator lived in California, California law governs the 
construction of his will.  Under California law, the construction 
of a will is a question of law unless the construction turns on 
the credibility of extrinsic evidence."). 
4
.  Although the district court noted that it had conducted an 
evidentiary hearing on the motion to execute on the trust 
interest, Schreiber, 849 F. Supp. at 384, the parties agree that 
the "primary purpose" of the hearing involved the applicability 
of section 157(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959) -- 
not interpretation of the will itself.  The trustees of the 
Wanamaker trust contend that the district court also received 
evidence relating to Wanamaker's intent at that hearing, but they 
failed to point out any evidence or testimony on intent.  The 
only evidence allegedly heard consisted of testimony and an 
affidavit noting that no one had ever before questioned the 
applicability of the spendthrift provision to Wanamaker's great-
grandchildren, but this evidence does not bear directly on the 
question of Wanamaker's intent.  Furthermore, the district court 
does not cite any factor other than the language of the will and 
case law to support its holding on the issue of Wanamaker's 
intent. 
  
 II. 
 Under Rule 69(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a federal court must follow relevant state law in a 
proceeding to execute on a judgment, unless a federal statute 
dictates otherwise.  See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 
354-58 (1966).  Because no applicable federal statute exists 
here, we look to Pennsylvania law to determine whether Schreiber 
may execute on Kellogg's interest in the Wanamaker trust.  
 A. 
 In general, "[t]rusts in which the interest of a 
beneficiary cannot be assigned by him or reached by his creditors 
have come to be known as 'spendthrift trusts.'"  2A Austin W. 
Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 151, at 83 (4th 
ed. 1987).5  No specific wording is required under Pennsylvania 
law to create a spendthrift trust.6  If a spendthrift trust is 
                     
5
.  Spendthrift trusts originated as a means to provide for 
people known as "spendthrifts," such as "infants, mental 
incompetents, [and] married women."  See Case Comment, 
Spendthrift Trusts -- The Public Policy Exception, 45 Mo. L. Rev. 
369, 372 (1980).  The beneficiary of a spendthrift trust, 
however, need not be a spendthrift.  See id. ("[I]t is no longer 
necessary that the beneficiary be a spendthrift."); Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts § 152 cmt. g ("A spendthrift trust may be 
created in favor of a beneficiary although he is competent to 
manage his own affairs."); 2A Austin W. Scott & William F. 
Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 151, at 83 (4th ed. 1987) ("[I]t is 
quite immaterial whether or not the beneficiary is in fact a 
spendthrift."). 
6
.  See Riverside Trust Co. v. Twitchell, 20 A.2d 768, 770 (Pa. 
1941) ("The intent to create a spendthrift trust is not to be set 
aside merely because it is not clearly expressed by the 
scrivener."); J. Brooke Aker, Pennsylvania Estate Planning and 
Drafting § 113.3, at 3 (1978) (noting that "no particular words 
are required" to create a spendthrift trust).  But see In re 
Benson, 615 A.2d 792, 795 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (stating that 
  
created, courts will sustain its validity,7 except in a few 
limited circumstances.8 
 Because the purported spendthrift trust here was 
created in a will, we must consider the intent of the testator, 
which under Pennsylvania law controls interpretation of a will's 
provisions.  In construing the same will at issue here, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained: 
 The intention of the testator is the pole 
star in the interpretation of every will and 
that intention must be ascertained from a 
consideration of the entire will, including 
its scheme of distribution, as well as its 
language, together with all the surrounding 
and attendant circumstances. 
In re Estate of Wanamaker, 159 A.2d 201, 204 (Pa. 1960) 
(citations omitted); see also In re Estate of Patrick, 409 A.2d 
388, 390 (Pa. 1979) ("[I]n construing a will, the intent of the 
testator, if it can be ascertained, must prevail."). 
 Similarly, the intent of the creator of a trust 
controls the interpretation of the trust document.  See In re 
Benson, 615 A.2d 792, 794-95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) ("The polestar 
(..continued) 
courts cannot "rewrite" or "distort" the language of a document 
creating a trust "in order to attain what is believed to be 
beneficial or wise or even what it is believed that the settlor 
would or should have provided if he possessed a knowledge of all 
presently existing circumstances"). 
7
.  See, e.g., In re Benson, 615 A.2d at 794 ("[W]here a 
spendthrift trust is in issue, the courts will uphold the 
spendthrift provisions as a means to enforce the settlor's right 
to dispose of his property as he chooses . . . ."). 
8
.  For a discussion of exceptions to the spendthrift trust rule, 
see infra part III.  
  
in every trust is the settlor's intent and that intent must 
prevail").  Pennsylvania courts agree the writing establishing a 
trust "'must be considered to be the best and controlling 
evidence of the settlor's intent.'"  Id. at 795 (quoting In re 
Girard Trust Corn Exch. Bank, 208 A.2d 857, 859 (Pa. 1965)).  
Because the trust here was created in the Wanamaker will, we look 
to the language of that will to determine the validity of the 
purported spendthrift provision. 
 B. 
 The relevant provisions of the will are Paragraphs 
Third and Eighth.  Paragraph Third9 established the stock trust 
                     
9
.  Although Paragraph Third continued for six pages, the most 
relevant part for our discussion appeared primarily on the first 
page.  It provided: 
 
  I own all the shares of the Capital 
Stock of John Wanamaker Philadelphia.  I 
order and direct they shall be held, In 
Trust, . . . for the following uses and 
purposes, to wit: 
 
  To receive all dividends, income or 
money derived therefrom, as same shall be 
declared and made payable by the Corporation 
of John Wanamaker Philadelphia, it being my 
wish, and direction, a Sinking Fund shall be 
created into which there shall be annually 
paid, from the net profits of John Wanamaker 
Philadelphia, . . . an amount equal to not 
less than fifty (50) per cent. of the annual 
profits, to be used in payment, and 
liquidation, on account of any indebtedness 
due by the above Corporation . . . and the 
difference between the amount of said net 
annual profits, and the amount paid into said 
Sinking Fund, shall then annually be divided 
equally between my three (3) children, 
Fernanda W. Heeren, John Wanamaker, Jr., 
Marie Louise Munn, during their life, for 
  
and divided certain proceeds between Wanamaker's children "for 
their sole and separate use, not to be anticipated, or assigned 
by them, in any manner whatever, nor subject to any attachment, 
alienation or sequestration for their debts, contracts or 
engagements."  There is no dispute that this language established 
a spendthrift trust protecting Wanamaker's children. 
(..continued) 
their sole and separate use, not to be 
anticipated, or assigned by them, in any 
matter whatever, nor subject to any 
attachment, alienation or sequestration for 
their debts, contracts or engagements. 
  
 Paragraph Eighth10 stipulated that the trust 
established in Paragraph Third also shall provide for descendants 
of the Wanamaker children "subject to the provisions herein 
previously contained."  The fundamental disagreement in this case 
is whether this language extends the spendthrift protection from 
Paragraph Third to cover the bequest to Wanamaker's grandchildren 
and great-grandchildren in Paragraph Eighth.  The district court 
held that it did, thereby providing spendthrift protection to 
Kellogg's interest.  Schreiber, 849 F. Supp. at 388-89.  But 
Schreiber contends the phrase merely means that a gift made in a 
                     
10
.  Paragraph Eighth provided: 
 
 In further Trust, on the part of my said 
Trustees, to hold said Capital Stock, and all 
dividends, income or money derived therefrom, 
subject to the provisions herein previously 
contained, for the benefit of all the child, 
or children, of all the children of my three 
(3) children, for and during the term of 
their natural life, or lives, of such of my 
said grandchildren, and for the period of 
twenty-one (21) years after the date of the 
decease of the last surviving grandchild.  In 
further Trust, at the expiration of the 
period of twenty-one (21) years, after the 
date of the decease of the last surviving 
grandchild, of my children, then said stock, 
or the proceeds which may be derived 
therefrom, to be equally divided, share and 
share alike, into as many parts as there may 
then be great-grandchildren of mine, 
surviving, and the descendant of any great-
grandchild, then surviving, the latter to 
receive and enjoy, subject to the provisions 
heretofore stated such share as their parent, 
or parents, would have enjoyed, had they then 
not been deceased. 
(emphasis added). 
  
preceding paragraph takes precedence over a gift stated later in 
the will. 
 To resolve this dispute, we must look to the language 
and structure of the entire will.  See, e.g., Riverside Trust Co. 
v. Twitchell, 20 A.2d 768, 770 (Pa. 1941); Ball v. Weightman, 116 
A. 653, 654 (Pa. 1922).  After the first two paragraphs made 
unrelated bequests, Paragraph Third created the stock trust and 
divided the proceeds into three general categories.  First, 
between one-half and two-thirds of the income from the trust was 
to pay outstanding debts of the John Wanamaker corporate 
entities.  Second, the remainder of the stock income was to be 
shared by Rodman Wanamaker's three children, subject to the 
spendthrift provisions noted earlier.  Upon the death of the 
Wanamaker children, their children were to split one-half of 
their parent's share.  Third, the other half share would be 
accumulated to fund various charities. 
 Paragraph Seventh noted that if, under Paragraph Third, 
the first category of money was not needed to pay Wanamaker 
corporate debts, then the entire income of the trust should be 
divided among the Wanamaker children.  "[B]ut the provisions as 
to the amount which shall go to my children's children, in the 
event of the decease of the former, shall remain as provided for 
in the paragraph heretofore."  The final relevant section, 
Paragraph Eighth, directed the trust income to the Wanamaker 
children's descendants "subject to the provisions herein 
previously contained." 
  
 Although Schreiber contends the limiting phrase in 
Paragraph Eighth merely prioritizes among gifts made in the will, 
we believe it means something more.  Paragraph Third created a 
detailed scheme of distribution to different categories of 
beneficiaries subject to certain conditions and restrictions, and 
the paragraphs following made bequests according to that scheme.  
We believe the restrictive phrase in Paragraph Eighth was meant 
to subject the bequests made therein to all applicable provisions 
of the previous paragraphs; the phrase was meant to state that 
the descendants of Rodman Wanamaker would receive the trust 
income under the scheme as established in Paragraph Third and 
followed in the other relevant paragraphs.  That scheme included 
a spendthrift provision for the individual beneficiaries.  We see 
no reason why that provision should not be among those to which 
the bequests in Paragraph Eighth were explicitly made "subject." 
 Other provisions of the will support this 
interpretation.  For example, Paragraph Fifth mandated the 
creation of an artisans school and adopted "[t]he same method of 
creating a principal sum" as used to fund a children's home 
established in Paragraph Third.  Paragraph Sixth provided for a 
sanitarium with funding "[a]s provided under the last paragraph, 
and fully set forth in the third paragraph."  Thus, it appears 
Rodman Wanamaker created a detailed funding mechanism from stock 
income in Paragraph Third of his will and envisioned that 
bequests made in the paragraphs following would conform to the 
rules applicable to that category of income. 
  
 Pennsylvania case law also supports this result.  In 
Ball v. Weightman, 116 A. 653 (Pa. 1922), the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court upheld spendthrift protection for a testator's 
great-grandchildren, even though the will specifically included 
such protection only for the testator's grandchildren.  
Repeatedly noting that it examined the "entire will" for an 
indication of the testator's intent, the court stated it saw: 
 nothing to indicate an intent to discriminate 
between beneficiaries, or to require the 
trustees to distribute the income direct to 
some, and not so to others.  Testator's 
manifest purpose was to secure the income of 
his estate for the personal use of his 
descendants during the life of the trust, and 
such protection is no more essential to a 
child or grandchild than to a great-
grandchild . . . . 
Id. at 654.11  Similarly, the Supreme Court in Riverside Trust 
Co. v. Twitchell, 20 A.2d 768 (Pa. 1941), decided that a deed of 
trust explicitly granting spendthrift protection over the 
principal of the trust, but not to the income, was meant to cover 
both. 
 Plaintiff argues that the expression 
contained in the trust agreement . . . 
signifies an intent to protect merely the 
principal.  Yet when the instrument is 
examined as a whole, it readily appears that 
                     
11
.  It is true that Ball partially relied on the fact that 
"throughout the will, testator seems to use the words 
'grandchildren,' 'issue,' and 'descendants' indiscriminately, 
when referring to those who might become lineal descendants of 
his children."  116 A. at 654.  We acknowledge that this is not 
the situation with the Wanamaker will.  But the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in Ball also relied on its examination of the 
entire will and the lack of any indication that the testator 
intended to discriminate between beneficiaries, id., a form of 
analysis that proves useful in this case. 
  
the grantor definitely intended an equal 
protection of the income.  The intent to 
create a spendthrift trust is not to be set 
aside merely because it is not clearly 
expressed by the scrivener.12 
Id. at 770.  From these cases, it appears the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court broadly construes spendthrift provisions when the 
testator has indicated a desire to incorporate such protection 
into a trust, but has failed to clearly define the scope of 
coverage.   
 Nevertheless, Schreiber notes that a separate trust 
created in the Wanamaker will explicitly made spendthrift 
protection applicable to the interests of all beneficiaries, the 
                     
12
.  In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has interpreted a 
trust created in a will to have spendthrift protection even when 
the will contained no such express language: 
 
  Is this a spendthrift trust?  It may be 
admitted that it lacks some of the usual 
provisions of such a paper, notably the 
absence of any clause protecting the income 
from attachment, etc.  If, however, we can 
gather from the will itself, and from the 
light of the circumstances surrounding the 
testator at the time he made it, that his 
intent was to create a spendthrift trust, 
such intent ought not to be defeated because 
his conveyancer blundered. 
 
Appeal of Grothe, 19 A. 1058, 1059 (Pa. 1890); see also Aker, 
supra, § 113.3, at 3 (noting that "no particular words are 
required" to create a spendthrift trust and that "a spendthrift 
clause may be implied"); 6 The Hon. David G. Hunter et al., 
Pennsylvania Orphans' Court Commonplace Book § 6(b), at 48 (2d 
ed. 1959) (citing numerous cases) ("Where such appears in the 
will to be the manifest intention of the testator, a spendthrift 
trust will be sustained, although the testator has not provided 
in terms that the estate of the beneficiary shall not be liable 
for his debts.").  
  
Wanamaker children and their descendants alike.  Paragraph Second 
created a trust from life insurance proceeds and directed the 
money be dispersed to Wanamaker's children "without power on 
their part to anticipate or assign the same, in any manner 
whatever, or be subject to any attachment, alienation or 
sequestration for their debts, contracts or engagements."  It 
further provided that, upon a child's death, the child's income 
be paid to the child's issue "in accordance with the same terms 
and conditions under which the parent, or parents enjoyed the 
same during their lifetime."  Thus, Schreiber contends Wanamaker 
knew how to make spendthrift protection applicable to all 
beneficiaries, his children and their descendants alike, but he 
chose not to do so with the beneficiaries of the Paragraph Third 
stock trust. 
 We agree with the district court that, in the context 
of this will, there is no meaningful difference between the 
phrases "in accordance with the same terms and conditions" and 
"subject to the provisions herein previously contained."  The 
different terminology instead appears merely to be a result of 
the structure of the will.  In just over one page, Paragraph 
Second established a relatively simple insurance trust, 
designated the Wanamaker children as beneficiaries protected by a 
spendthrift provision, and provided that the children's 
descendants would benefit "in accordance with the same terms and 
conditions under which the parent, or parents enjoyed the same 
during their lifetime."  By contrast, Paragraph Third established 
the stock trust, created categories of funding, and made bequests 
  
to the Wanamaker children subject to the spendthrift clause.  
Eight pages later, after further elaboration on the stock trust 
and its beneficiaries, Paragraph Eighth then named the Wanamaker 
children's descendants as beneficiaries "subject to the 
provisions herein previously contained."  Thus, Paragraph Eighth 
made the Wanamaker children's descendants subject to the entire 
scheme of distribution created for the stock trust -- not just a 
few limiting provisos as under the Paragraph Second insurance 
trust.13  
                     
13
.  The language of Paragraph Second supports the proposition 
that Wanamaker intended spendthrift protection to cover his 
great-grandchildren under the Paragraph Third stock trust.  In In 
re Wanamaker Estate, No. 38,456 (Montgomery County Orphans' Ct. 
Feb. 27, 1975), which interpreted this same trust, the issue was 
whether Wanamaker's great-grandchildren succeeded to their 
parents' income interests in the Paragraph Third stock trust.  
Although Paragraphs Third and Eighth did not resolve the issue, 
Paragraph Twenty-Second of the will addressed similar 
distribution rights under a residuary trust.  Based largely upon 
the wording of this other trust, Judge Taxis concluded that 
Wanamaker's great-grandchildren were beneficiaries of the 
Paragraph Third stock trust:  
 
 [T]he language [of the Paragraph Twenty-
Second trust] clearly evidences a general per 
stirpital plan of distribution by the 
testator.  Almost certainly the testator's 
intention concerning "Stock Trust" income 
would have been equally explicit but the 
scrivener failed to provide for the gap in 
time from the death of a grandchild until 
termination of the trust.  There is no 
indication anywhere in the will that the 
testator intended to establish a pattern of 
income distribution in the "Stock Trust" 
distinct from that of the Residuary Trust. 
 
Id., slip op. at 5-6.  Similarly, there is no indication in the 
will that Wanamaker intended to establish a level of spendthrift 
protection for the stock trust distinct from that created for the 
Paragraph Second insurance trust. 
  
 Furthermore, we are reluctant to impose artificial 
distinctions between these similar phrases in a will that has 
been criticized repeatedly for its careless drafting.  See, e.g., 
In re Estate of Wanamaker, 159 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 1960) ("A 
number of provisions of Mr. Wanamaker's will (a) were ambiguous, 
and others (b) would have violated the Rule against Perpetuities 
. . . ."); In re Wanamaker's Estate, 6 A.2d 852, 854 (Pa. 1939) 
(noting the wording of Paragraph Eighth of the will was 
"characteristic of the slovenly method of the scrivener" and 
referring to "confused language used by the testator"). 
 Therefore, given the language and structure of the 
will, the acknowledged imprecision in its terminology, and the 
broadness with which Pennsylvania courts have treated spendthrift 
provisions, we agree with the district court and hold that the 
spendthrift provision here encompasses Kellogg's interest in the 
trust. 
 III. 
 Because a spendthrift provision is involved, we must 
decide whether Pennsylvania would adopt section 157(c) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which permits creditors to reach 
spendthrift trust interests to satisfy claims for services or 
materials that preserved or benefitted the beneficiary's interest 
in the trust.  No Pennsylvania court has resolved this question.  
Indeed, neither the parties nor this court could locate more than 
one reported decision from any jurisdiction addressing this 
issue.  Accordingly, we must determine whether the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would adopt section 157(c) and, if so, whether it 
  
is applicable under the facts of this case.  See Commissioner v. 
Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967); Bohus v. Beloff, 950 
F.2d 919, 924 (3d Cir. 1991).  
 A. 
 Section 157 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
provides: 
 Although a trust is a spendthrift trust or a 
trust for support, the interest of the 
beneficiary can be reached in satisfaction of 
an enforceable claim against the beneficiary, 
 
  (a) by the wife or child of the 
beneficiary for support, or by the wife for 
alimony; 
 
  (b) for necessary services rendered to 
the beneficiary or necessary supplies 
furnished to him; 
 
  (c) for services rendered and materials 
furnished which preserve or benefit the 
interest of the beneficiary; 
 
  (d) by the United States or a State to 
satisfy a claim against the beneficiary. 
(emphasis added). 
 Section 157(c) has two fundamental purposes.  First, it 
was intended to prevent unjust enrichment of a beneficiary,14 and 
                     
14
.  Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 157(c) cmt. d ("In such a 
case the beneficiary would be unjustly enriched if such a claim 
were not allowed"); Scott & Fratcher, supra, § 157.3, at 208 
("The purpose of the settlor in imposing restrictions on the 
alienation of the beneficiary's interest is to prevent him from 
losing his interest by his own improvidence.  There is no reason, 
however, why his interest under the trust should be exempt from 
the claims of those who have by their services conferred a 
benefit on his interest.  He should not be permitted to profit at 
their expense."). 
  
second, to ensure that beneficiaries were able to obtain 
necessary resources to protect their interests.15  
 B. 
 As the state credited with first recognizing the 
validity of spendthrift trusts,16 Pennsylvania has more than 150 
                     
15
.  See Erwin N. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts § 346, at 410 (2d 
ed. 1947) ("Without such a remedy, needy beneficiaries may be 
wholly unable to enforce their interests or to obtain protection 
in case the trust is not properly administered."); see also Anne 
S. Emanuel, Spendthrift Trusts: It's Time to Codify the 
Compromise, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 179, 196 (1993) (Section 157(c) 
"assures that the beneficiary's interest in the trust will not be 
diminished or lost because the person in a position to protect it 
declines to do so for fear her efforts would be uncompensated."). 
16
.  See, e.g., John L. Bigelow, Support Claims of the Wife and 
the Spendthrift Trust Interest of the Husband-Beneficiary, 51 
Dick. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1946) ("the doctrine of the spendthrift trust 
is said to have originated" in Pennsylvania); Griswold, supra, § 
26, at 22 (footnote omitted) ("These early Pennsylvania cases not 
only were the foundation of spendthrift trusts in that state, but 
they were also frequently cited and relied on in other 
jurisdictions.  They formed the principal basis of the dictum in 
Nichols v. Eaton [91 U.S. 716 (1875)] which was the greatest 
single factor in the establishment of spendthrift trusts in the 
United States."); Wills - Spendthrift Clause - Legacies - 
Assignment, Fiduciary Rev., June 1941, at 1 ("Pennsylvania was 
the first jurisdiction to recognize spendthrift trusts.").  
Griswold explained that the development of spendthrift trusts 
occurred in Pennsylvania because the state had no equity courts 
and the law courts had no equity powers:     
 
 The result was that if a man had what 
elsewhere would have been regarded as an 
equitable right, there was little or no means 
of dealing with it in Pennsylvania.  
Creditors were therefore unable to reach the 
interest of a beneficiary, since there was no 
procedure at law for that purpose. . . .  
When, in later years, the Pennsylvania courts 
gradually acquired equity powers, spendthrift 
trusts had become firmly established, and an 
accepted part of the law. 
 
Griswold, supra, § 26, at 21-22. 
  
years' worth of jurisprudence on the issue.17  Originally, 
"spendthrift trusts were upheld in their entirety by Pennsylvania 
courts on the theory that property rights include the right to 
place any type of restriction on . . . disposition."  Wills - 
Spendthrift Clause - Legacies - Assignment, Fiduciary Rev., June 
1941, at 1.   Yet, as time passed, Pennsylvania courts began 
recognizing exceptions to the spendthrift trust rule, see id. at 
1-4, even when that meant overruling prior case law.  See, e.g., 
John L. Bigelow, Support Claims of the Wife and the Spendthrift 
Trust Interest of the Husband-Beneficiary, 51 Dick. L. Rev. 1, 2 
(1946) (noting Pennsylvania courts' "change of position from one 
extreme to the other" with regard to a woman's ability to attach 
the spendthrift interest of her husband).     
 This evolution of spendthrift trust law in Pennsylvania 
is consistent with the law's development in the majority of 
American jurisdictions.  As one treatise explained: 
  [T]he trend of the last twenty-five 
years has been to limit and qualify 
spendthrift trusts, either by statute or by 
judicial decisions which create exceptions of 
the types described at a later point.  The 
spirit of nineteenth century individualism 
which originally validated these trusts is 
meeting opposition of a socially-minded 
character. 
George G. Bogert & George T. Bogert, Handbook of the Law of 
Trusts § 40, at 154 (5th ed. 1973) (footnote omitted); see also 
                     
17
.  The Pennsylvania doctrine on spendthrift trusts apparently 
originated in the 1829 case of Fisher v. Taylor, 2 Rawle 33 (Pa. 
1829) (Smith, J.).  See Wills - Spendthrift Clause - Legacies - 
Assignment, supra, at 1.  
  
Jacob Mertens, Jr., Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation § 
49E.35 (1993) ("Inroads have been made upon the effectiveness of 
spendthrift trusts by permitting certain classes of claims to be 
satisfied from the income of such trusts . . . ."). 
 C. 
 As we have noted, no Pennsylvania court has considered 
whether section 157(c) should be adopted.18  In fact, only one 
state's court apparently has decided the issue.  Evans & Luptak 
v. Obolensky, 487 N.W.2d 521 (Mich. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 496 
N.W.2d 289 (Mich. 1992), involved a situation similar to this 
case.  In Evans, the trust beneficiary hired a law firm to secure 
the best price for the primary assets of the trust, but failed to 
pay the firm after the sale occurred.  The firm obtained a 
judgment against the beneficiary, and a lower court denied 
execution on the trust proceeds.  The Michigan Court of Appeals, 
in adopting section 157(c), reversed and remanded.  The court 
                     
18
.  Kellogg claims the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the 
application of section 157(c) in In re Heyl's Estate, 43 A.2d 130 
(Pa. 1945), which involved a trust established for two sisters by 
their father.  One sister made an agreement with the trustee by 
which the trustee would build her a house and she would pay for 
it out of future trust income.  When the beneficiary revoked the 
agreement, the court held that she had been without right to 
assign her interest and thus the original agreement with the 
trustee was void.  Because the burden of maintaining the house 
fell back to the corpus of the trust, it impaired the other 
beneficiary's interest, but that factor was not deemed sufficient 
to justify violating the spendthrift provisions.  Id. at 131-32.  
Although this case demonstrates the reluctance of state courts to 
intrude upon spendthrift provisions, it does not reject the 
Restatement position.  The case certainly does not fall under 
157(c), because the trustee's action did not "preserve or 
benefit" the beneficiary's interest in the trust.  
  
noted that Michigan courts already had approved the other 
sections of the Restatement: "From the preceding analysis it is 
clear that the Restatement has been approved by every applicable 
appellate decision in Michigan since 1983 and that all the 
subsections of § 157 of the Restatement that were in issue in the 
cases were adopted with approval by either the Court of Appeals 
or the Supreme Court."  Id. at 523.  
 Schreiber contends that, as in Evans, the state courts 
in Pennsylvania have adopted all the other subsections of section 
157.  Subsection (a), which permits trust assets to be reached to 
satisfy alimony or support claims, has been substantially -- if 
not entirely -- adopted in Pennsylvania.  For more than sixty 
years, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has permitted wives to 
reach the assets of spendthrift trusts to satisfy claims for 
support.  See In re Moorehead's Estate, 137 A. 802 (Pa. 1927); 
see also In re Stewart's Estate, 5 A.2d 910 (Pa. 1939). 
 The district court noted, however, that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to permit an out-of-state 
alimony judgment to reach assets of a spendthrift trust in 
Lippincott v. Lippincott, 37 A.2d 741 (Pa. 1944); thus, the 
district court said the Supreme Court implicitly rejected part of 
Restatement section 157(a).  Schreiber, 849 F. Supp. at 391.  
Yet, at the time of Lippincott, Pennsylvania had no provision for 
alimony in an absolute divorce;19 therefore, the Supreme Court's 
                     
19
.  Pennsylvania had no provision for alimony in an absolute 
divorce until the General Assembly enacted the Divorce Code of 
1980.  See 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 3101-05, 3701-07 (1991) 
  
refusal to create a public policy exception for alimony payments 
should not be seen as a rejection of section 157 because the 
state at the time did not even recognize such payments.20  
Furthermore, the state now has a broad statute that provides: 
 Income of a trust subject to spendthrift or 
similar provisions shall nevertheless be 
liable for the support of anyone whom the 
income beneficiary shall be under a legal 
duty to support. 
20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6112 (1975).  This statute apparently 
encompasses claims for alimony, as required by section 157(a).  
See 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3103 (1991) (defining alimony as 
"[a]n order for support granted by this Commonwealth or any other 
state to a spouse or former spouse in conjunction with a decree 
granting a divorce or annulment"); Karen A. Fahrner et al., Bregy 
on Selected Sections of the Pennsylvania Probate, Estates and 
Fiduciaries Code § 6112, at 170 (Supp. 1993) ("[T]his part of the 
Lippincott decision would be different under the wording of 
present §6112 which makes spendthrift income liable to 'anyone 
whom the income beneficiary shall be under a legal duty to 
(..continued) 
(containing part of the Divorce Code of 1990, which replaced the 
1980 version).  
20
.  A law review article noted at the time of the Lippincott 
decision that its result was required because the state had no 
public policy in favor of support for former spouses:  "With the 
termination of the marriage the husband's duty of support, and 
the State's interest as a third party, ceases.  Thus the reason 
for denying a spendthrift trust ascendancy in such a situation 
ceases when public policy no longer exists."  Bigelow, supra, at 
10. 
  
support.'").  In fact, the language of the statute appears to go 
beyond even that required by the Restatement.21 
 As for Restatement section 157(b), the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court cited the subsection with approval in Lang v. 
Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't of Public Welfare, 528 A.2d 1335, 
1341-42 (Pa. 1987).  In Lang, the Supreme Court noted that "[a] 
support trust, though containing an implied spendthrift 
provision, can generally be reached to satisfy claims for 
necessary services rendered to the beneficiary.  See Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts, § 157 (1959)."  Because Lang involved a 
                     
21
.  We consider it significant that the Pennsylvania courts 
repeatedly have expanded this exception to the spendthrift trust 
rule.  In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court refused to permit a wife to attach her husband's 
interest in a spendthrift trust.  See, e.g., Board of Charities 
v. Lockard, 48 A. 496, 496 (Pa. 1901) ("We agree entirely with 
all that has been said about the duty of the beneficiary to 
support his wife and child; but that does not authorize 
interference with the right of another individual to dispose of 
his own property as he may see fit."); see also Thackara v. 
Mintzer, 100 Pa. 151, 154-55 (Pa. 1882).  Yet, over the next 
several decades, the Pennsylvania courts did an "obvious about-
face in the law" and began to permit attachments of spendthrift 
interests.  See Bigelow, supra, at 2.  
 
 Furthermore, commentators have stated that nationwide 
"[a] division of authorities exists on questions concerning 
whether the beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust can be 
reached by his wife and children to enforce claims for support, 
or by a former wife for an alimony claim."  William H. Wicker, 
Spendthrift Trusts, 10 Gonz. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1974).  We find it 
noteworthy that, unlike some jurisdictions which continue to 
reject claims for invasion of a spouse's spendthrift trust 
interest, Pennsylvania courts appear to be in accord with the 
Restatement position.  In fact, instead of Pennsylvania adopting 
the Restatement, one commentator suggested that the Restatement 
"adopted this Pennsylvania common law view."  Bigelow, supra, at 
7. 
  
support trust, however, the district court held the case did not 
stand for the proposition that interests in a spendthrift trust 
could be reached under section 157(b).  We disagree.  Section 
157, by its terms, encompasses both spendthrift and support 
trusts.  The Lang court did not express any intention to 
distinguish between those types of trusts in determining the 
applicability of the Restatement; it simply cited section 157 
with approval. 
 Furthermore, in Quigley Estate, 22 D. & C.2d 598 
(Montgomery County Orphans' Ct. 1960), Judge Alfred L. Taxis, 
Jr., approved a beneficiary's assignment of her interest in a 
spendthrift trust to the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare.  The 
court, in upholding the "right of the Commonwealth to recover for 
furnishing the legatee with such fundamental necessities of 
life," expressly cited section 157 as support for its decision.  
Id. at 599; see also Wills - Spendthrift Clause - Legacies - 
Assignment, supra, at 2 (citing numerous Pennsylvania cases) 
("The state may reach spendthrift trusts in reimbursement for the 
care of an income cestui who has become a public charge.").  
 Quigley Estate and similar cases adopt the reasoning 
not only of section 157(b), but also of section 157(d), which 
allows spendthrift trust interests to be reached in satisfaction 
of government claims.  Another Pennsylvania case upholding the 
application of section 157(d) is Scott Estate, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 
589 (Montgomery County Orphans' Ct. 1957), in which the Treasury 
Department served a writ of attachment on the executors of a 
trust to recover unpaid taxes of the beneficiary.  Judge Taxis 
  
noted the applicability of section 157(d), but stated he did "not 
assume to decide the effectiveness of this attachment."  Id. at 
592.  Nevertheless, relying in part on section 157(d), the court 
permitted the amount of the unpaid taxes to be retained, pending 
a resolution of the attachment.  Id. at 592-93.22 
 The district court stated that these cases demonstrated 
that Pennsylvania courts had not adopted the other subsections of 
section 157 in their entirety.  Yet, we believe this overlooks a 
crucial point.  The Michigan court, in adopting section 157(c), 
commented that "the Restatement has been approved by every 
applicable appellate decision in Michigan since 1983."  Evans, 
487 N.W.2d at 523.  In Pennsylvania, the courts have approved the 
relevant Restatement subsections in every applicable case for a 
much longer period, with an understandable exception in 
Lippincott, 37 A.2d at 743-44.  We have found no Pennsylvania 
                     
22
.  For decades, commentators have cited Scott Estate for the 
proposition that Pennsylvania permits the United States to attach 
spendthrift trust interests to recover unpaid taxes.  See, e.g., 
Aker, supra, § 113.3, at 4 ("Despite existence of a spendthrift 
clause, the legatee's interest may be attached by the United 
States for delinquent income taxes . . . ."); Hunter et al., 
supra, § 6(k), at 52 ("attachment by U.S. for income taxes of 
legatee is valid").  Furthermore, it is doubtful whether 
Pennsylvania even has the power to shield interests in a 
spendthrift trust from federal tax liens.  See First Northwestern 
Trust Co. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 622 F.2d 387, 390 (8th Cir. 
1980) (noting the "well established legal principle that the 
income from a spendthrift trust is not immune from federal tax 
liens, notwithstanding any state laws or recognized exemptions to 
the contrary"); United States v. Rye, 550 F.2d 682, 685 (1st Cir. 
1977) ("In the area of spendthrift trusts, the courts have 
consistently held that a restraint on transferability, whether 
arising from the trust instrument or from state law, does not 
immunize the beneficiary's interest from a federal tax lien."). 
  
case that has expressly declined to follow Restatement section 
157 or even criticized it.  In fact, Pennsylvania courts 
routinely cite as authority for their decisions the Restatement 
of Trusts, including sections of the Restatement governing 
spendthrift trusts.23  Given the rationale underlying section 
157(c), and the favorable treatment Pennsylvania courts have 
afforded other subsections of section 157 and the Restatement 
overall,24 we believe the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt 
section 157(c).25 
                     
23
.  In fact, a few years after publication of the original 
Restatement of Trusts in 1935, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
handed down In re Keeler's Estate, 3 A.2d 413 (Pa. 1939), a 
decision that "relie[d] principally" on the Restatement 
provisions on spendthrift trusts and on Erwin N. Griswold's book, 
Spendthrift Trusts.  See Trusts - Spendthrift - For Support - 
Assignment - Unrevoked, Fiduciary Rev., Mar. 1939, at 1.  For 
other examples of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's citation to 
the Restatement on spendthrift trust issues, see Lang v. 
Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't of Public Welfare, 528 A.2d 1335, 
1341-42 (Pa. 1987); Morton v. Morton, 147 A.2d 150, 152 (Pa. 
1959); Murphey v. C.I.T. Corp., 33 A.2d 16, 18 (Pa. 1943); see 
also Hunter et al., supra, § 6(a)-(b), at 47-49; Robert Levin et 
al., Summary of Pennsylvania Jurisprudence: Trusts and Gifts 
Inter Vivos §§ 183-186, at 153-159 (1962). 
24
.  Counsel for Kellogg suggested at oral argument that, even if 
we hold that Pennsylvania would adopt Restatement section 157(c), 
our decision might not apply retroactively to testamentary 
trusts, such as the one here, established before publication of 
the first Restatement of Trusts in 1935.  We disagree.  Section 
157 appears to have been a distillation of existing law on the 
subject, not a radical change.  In fact, the most fundamental 
development in this area of Pennsylvania law on spendthrift 
trusts may well have been In re Moorehead's Estate, 137 A. 802 
(Pa. 1927), which first permitted the invasion of a spendthrift 
trust interest on public policy grounds.  As noted, this case 
appeared almost a decade before the publication of the first 
Restatement and may even have influenced the adoption of section 
157.  See supra note 21.  The decision in Moorehead's Estate, 
like most cases in this area, applied retroactively to the trust 
involved.  As the United States Supreme Court has noted, "As a 
  
 IV. 
 Although we hold that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would adopt Restatement section 157(c), we still must determine 
whether the district court properly ruled that Pennsylvania 
courts would not apply the Restatement "under the circumstances 
of this case."  Schreiber, 849 F. Supp. at 394. 
 A. 
 As an initial matter, we consider whether this type of 
case, involving an attorney seeking reimbursement for services 
rendered in connection with a trust interest, generally fits 
within section 157(c).  We believe it does.  In fact, as we have 
noted, the only case heretofore adopting section 157(c) involved 
a beneficiary who hired a law firm to secure the best price for 
the primary assets of a trust, but failed to pay the firm after 
(..continued) 
rule, judicial decisions apply 'retroactively.'  Indeed, a legal 
system based on precedent has a built-in presumption of 
retroactivity."  Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642 (1984) 
(citation omitted).    
25
.  The district court noted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
admonition that the invasion of spendthrift trust assets should 
be an "extraordinary" remedy employed only when truly vital 
interests were at stake.  Schreiber, 849 F. Supp. at 392 (quoting 
Lippincott v. Lippincott, 37 A.2d 741, 743 (Pa. 1944)).  Although 
we have noted that the result of Lippincott would no longer be 
valid because of changes in the laws regarding alimony and 
invasion of spendthrift trust interests for support payments, see 
supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text, Pennsylvania courts have 
not backed away from the reasoning of Lippincott, i.e., that only 
"extraordinary" circumstances warrant invasion of spendthrift 
trusts.  Endorsement of section 157(c), however, will not alter 
the extraordinary nature of the remedy, given the relatively few 
exceptions allowed by the Restatement and the limited number of 
cases that have cited to them. 
  
the sale occurred.  Evans & Luptak v. Obolensky, 487 N.W.2d 521 
(Mich. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 496 N.W.2d 289 (Mich. 1992). 
 Furthermore, one commentator cited this situation as an 
example of the proper application of the principles underlying 
section 157(c): 
  Although an attorney, so far as payment 
for his general services is concerned, stands 
no better than an ordinary creditor in 
reaching the interest in a spendthrift trust, 
he is, nevertheless, entitled in New York to 
recover from his client's income for services 
rendered in connection with the client's 
interest in the trust.  These cases seem to 
be a proper application of the principle that 
the beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift 
trust may be alienated for the purpose of 
preserving or improving its value. 
Erwin N. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts § 346, at 409-10 (2d ed. 
1947) (footnotes omitted); see also Scott & Fratcher, supra, § 
157.3, at 209.  But see Griswold, supra, § 346, at 410 (noting 
that "attorneys have not been so successful" in some states in 
recovering under this theory).  
 B. 
 In considering the applicability of section 157(c), the 
district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and held that 
Pennsylvania courts would not apply Restatement section 157(c) to 
this case.  Schreiber, 849 F. Supp. at 384, 394.  Specifically, 
the court determined that, because Rodman Wanamaker had expressly 
indicated he wished the trustees to remain free from interference 
by the beneficiaries,26 invasion of the spendthrift trust 
                     
26
.  See Schreiber, 849 F. Supp. at 393 (quoting provisions of 
the will).  
  
interest here would "negate the wishes of Rodman Wanamaker."  Id. 
at 394.27 
 The district court received evidence on this issue, and 
we consider its decision to be a factual finding.  Yet, we 
believe the court applied an incorrect legal standard to decide 
this aspect of the case.  There is nothing in the Restatement 
providing that, in applying the section 157 exceptions to the 
spendthrift rule, the testator's intent should be considered. 
 If a testator's intent controlled whether an exception 
to spendthrift protection was allowed, then none of the 
Restatement section 157 exceptions could ever apply.  This is so 
because if a testator had intended the result mandated by the 
                     
27
.  The district court divided Schreiber's representation of 
Kellogg into two time periods: representation during the sale of 
the Wanamaker stock and representation during the subsequent 
surcharge action against the trustees.  As for the representation 
during the sale of the stock, the district court held that 
Schreiber had discharged Kellogg for all liability for that 
period.  Id.  Because Schreiber did not appeal this portion of 
the district court's ruling, the only representation at issue is 
Schreiber's work for Kellogg during the surcharge action against 
the trustees. 
 
 Kellogg contends that the entire fee issue is barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata, because the Montgomery County 
Orphans' Court already awarded Schreiber fees in connection with 
his representation of Kellogg.  See supra part I.  As the 
district court indicated, however, the Orphans' Court fee award 
involved Schreiber's representation during the sale of the stock 
only, not his later work on the surcharge action.  See Schreiber, 
849 F. Supp. at 384-85.  As we have noted, Schreiber received 
more than $200,000 for his representation involving the sale of 
the stock: $117,000 in counsel fees and interest awarded by the 
Montgomery County Orphans' Court and $88,000, plus counsel fees 
and interest, from a judgment obtained against another attorney 
involved in the stock sale for breach of a fee-sharing agreement.  
See supra part I.    
  
section 157 exceptions, then presumably he would have said so in 
the will, and there would be no need to look beyond the will for 
policy reasons that warrant invasion of the trust.  Despite the 
usual importance of a testator's intent in construing the terms 
of a will or trust,28 Pennsylvania courts have not hesitated to 
disregard such intent when public policy requires.  See, e.g., In 
re Moorehead's Estate, 137 A. 802, 806 (Pa. 1927) ("A testator 
has a right . . . to dispose of his own property with such 
restrictions and limitations not repugnant to law, as he sees 
fit, and his intentions ought to be carried out, unless they 
contravene some positive rule of law or are against public 
policy.").29 
 Thus, we believe the district court must determine 
whether Schreiber's work for Kellogg did "preserve or benefit the 
                     
28
.  See supra part II.A. 
29
.  See also Morton v. Morton, 147 A.2d 150, 151 (Pa. 1959) ("It 
has long been our public policy that the spendthrift provisions 
of a trust cannot defeat the claims of the wife of a beneficiary 
for maintenance and support."); In re Stewart's Estate, 5 A.2d 
910, 914 (Pa. 1939) (citation omitted) ("Since we have declared 
that spendthrift trusts are against public policy in this State 
as to claims of wives for maintenance and support, they are 
entitled to recover against the beneficial interest of their 
husbands as though no spendthrift clause was contained in the 
will or deed creating them."); Thomas v. Thomas, 172 A. 36, 41 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1934) ("To the extent that the cases prior to the 
decision in Moorehead's Estate differ therefrom, the former must 
be considered as overruled.  It is a step in the right direction 
and consonant with public policy and good morals."); Levin et 
al., supra, § 183, at 155 ("A spendthrift or other protective 
trust cannot be established in contravention of statute or public 
policy."). 
  
interest of the beneficiary."30  Schreiber contends that this 
analysis does not require the court to decide whether an actual 
preservation or benefit to the beneficiary's interest occurred, 
but instead whether a good-faith attempt to preserve or benefit 
the interest was made.31 
   We disagree.  By its terms, section 157(c) does not 
require merely an action that might preserve or benefit the 
beneficiary's interest, but instead mandates that the action 
achieve the result of preserving or benefitting the interest in 
the trust.  See § 157(c) ("the interest of the beneficiary can be 
reached . . . for services rendered and materials furnished which 
preserve or benefit the interest of the beneficiary"); see also 
Griswold, supra, § 366, at 445 ("[T]he creditor should be allowed 
to recover at least to the extent that his labor and materials 
have improved the value of the beneficiary's interest."). 
 The purposes behind section 157(c) support this 
interpretation.  Section 157(c) permits the attachment of 
spendthrift interests because a beneficiary "should not be 
permitted to profit at [his creditor's] expense."  Scott & 
Fratcher, supra, § 157.3, at 208.  Similarly, the Restatement 
notes that section 157(c) is necessary because "the beneficiary 
                     
30
.  The parties dispute whether the district court made a 
finding whether Schreiber did "preserve or benefit" Kellogg's 
interest.  We do not believe the district court made such a 
determination. 
31
.  Evans & Luptak v. Obolensky, 487 N.W.2d 521, 523 (Mich. Ct. 
App.), appeal denied, 496 N.W.2d 289 (Mich. 1992), raised this 
issue but left it undecided. 
  
would be unjustly enriched if such a claim were not allowed."  
Restatement § 157(c) cmt. d.  In cases in which the beneficiary's 
interest is not actually preserved or benefitted, however, the 
beneficiary has received no "profit" at all; thus, he cannot have 
been "unjustly enriched."  We believe this interpretation is 
consistent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's admonition that 
the invasion of spendthrift trust interests should be an 
"extraordinary and drastic remedy."  Lippincott v. Lippincott, 37 
A.2d 741, 743 (Pa. 1944). 
 Nevertheless, Schreiber contends this interpretation 
would emasculate one of the policies underlying section 157(c), 
namely, ensuring that needy beneficiaries obtain the necessary 
resources to protect their interests in a trust.  Without a 
standard allowing recovery for "good-faith" attempts, Schreiber 
argues, few attorneys or other creditors would ever agree to help 
beneficiaries in these circumstances.  Schreiber cites no legal 
authority for this proposition.32  We believe his argument is 
answered by the widespread acceptance of the most common practice 
designed to ensure that those in need obtain proper 
representation: contingency fee agreements, which require a 
favorable result to generate fees.  As one treatise noted, 
                     
32
.  In fact, the district court's August 3, 1993 findings appear 
to contradict the basis for Schreiber's argument.  The court 
noted that Schreiber advised Kellogg not to sue the trustees 
because "it would be a long hard fight to prevail in any 
surcharge action."  Tr. at 6.  The court also stated that none of 
the other members of the Wanamaker family supported Kellogg's 
surcharge action against the trustees.  Id. at 8.  Yet, Schreiber 
still agreed to represent Kellogg in the surcharge action.     
  
"Contingency arrangements ideally have the advantages of 
encouraging quality work and discouraging excessive work, because 
the attorney's compensation is directly tied to the quality of 
the outcome . . . ."  Robert E. Litan & Steven C. Salop, 
Reforming the Lawyer-Client Relationship Through Alternative 
Billing Methods, 77 Judicature 191, 195 (1994).  This approach is 
also similar to that embodied in the various federal fee-shifting 
statutes:  Attorneys can recover their fees in certain cases, but 
only when they represent the "prevailing party."  See, e.g., 28 
U.S.C. § 2412 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (permitting award of 
attorneys' fees to "prevailing party" under Equal Access to 
Justice Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1993) (allowing award of 
attorneys' fees to "prevailing party" in civil rights cases).  
Like Restatement section 157(c), these statutes reward only those 
efforts that actually succeed in benefitting a plaintiff, not 
those that are well-intentioned but fail.  See Baumgartner v. 
Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 548 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting 
the Supreme Court has adopted "a result-oriented approach" to fee 
awards).  Accordingly, we do not believe it unfair to require 
Schreiber to demonstrate that the surcharge action actually 
"preserve[d] or benefit[ted]" Kellogg's interest in the trust.33   
 This construction of section 157(c) does not mean that 
                     
33
.  Whether creditors may recover for a non-pecuniary 
preservation or benefit to a trust interest is a more difficult 
question.  We note that in other contexts we have not always 
required attorneys to prove a pecuniary benefit in order to 
recover fees.  But we have required that the benefit must be 
real.  See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 
1310-13 (3d Cir. 1993).  
  
those who unsuccessfully attempt to benefit an interest in a 
spendthrift trust should not be paid for their services.  It 
merely means that the equities of the situation are not so far in 
their favor as to warrant the "extraordinary and drastic remedy" 
of an invasion of a spendthrift trust interest.  Such creditors 
still may pursue alternative measures to collect debts.  
 V. 
 Based upon the foregoing, we will reverse and remand 
this case to the district court for a determination of whether 
Schreiber's work for Kellogg did "preserve or benefit the 
interest of the beneficiary," within the meaning of Restatement § 
157(c).  In all other respects, we will affirm the judgment of 
the district court. 
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LEWIS, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 I would have found that the Wanamaker will's 
spendthrift protection did not protect from attachment Kellogg's 
interest in the Wanamaker trust.  Furthermore, I am somewhat 
skeptical about whether the courts of Pennsylvania would adopt 
section 157(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts.  However, 
the majority provides a well-reasoned and defensible rationale 
  
with respect to both of its conclusions, and the issues being far 
from clear, I concur.  On remand Schreiber may receive at least a 
portion of the money Kellogg owes him, and I am sure that if we 
are wrong about section 157(c), the courts of Pennsylvania will 
let us know in due course. 
 
